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Enhancing Autonomy in Paid Surrogacy
Jennifer Damelio and Kelly Sorensen
Bioethics, 2008

The gestational surrogate – and her economic and educational
vulnerability in particular – is the focus of many of the most persistent worries
about paid surrogacy. Those who employ her, and those who broker and organize
her services, usually have an advantage over her in resources and information.
That asymmetry exposes her to the possibility of exploitation and abuse.
State laws across the U.S. are still ambivalent about paid surrogacy. Many
states have no surrogacy laws at all, and there is no orthodoxy among those that
do. States that explicitly address the gestational surrogate’s vulnerability
generally do so in a crude way.
Some make paid surrogacy contracts illegal, even though this may
compromise women’s autonomy; others simply nullify surrogacy contracts in
disputes, as New Jersey did in the well-known Baby M case. Because of her
likely financial circumstances, the New Jersey Supreme Court argued that paying
a gestational surrogate may ‘make her decision less voluntary’.1 Candidate
surrogates tend to have significantly lower incomes than their employers, and so
are more subject to coercion in such circumstances; for this reason, and also from
concerns about the best interests of children, the Court determined that the
surrogacy contract in the Baby M case was invalid.
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Other writers advocate making paid surrogacy explicitly legal, arguing
that among a woman’s reproductive rights should be the freedom to enter into
contracts that pay for gestational labor. But even those who occupy this position
worry about the gestational surrogate’s vulnerability. One answer is to ensure
that the surrogate who changes her mind and wants to keep the resulting child
may do so. Modeled after adoption statutes with a similar opt-out clause, this
approach leaves an important sort of power and autonomy in the hands of the
surrogate.2
We want to suggest a new and additional answer to these worries – one
that both protects the gestational surrogate and enhances her autonomy. We
propose that states that allow paid surrogacy should require, as a minimum
necessary requirement for the contract to be legal, that the surrogate participate in
a short class on contract pregnancy. The content of this class, which we will
discuss more below, would include information about the experience of other paid
surrogates, what can and cannot legally be required of surrogates, and alternative
forms of employment. The class will improve the surrogate’s opportunity to
make an autonomous decision and guard her right to make choices about
reproduction and her body.

2
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Policies of this sort, sometimes called ‘soft law’,3 require an individual to
be well-informed before pursuing activities that include some important risk. We
will argue that a soft law policy in the case of paid surrogacy addresses central
concerns about the gestational surrogate’s vulnerability. A legal ban forbids too
much, and bald legal permission allows too much; but a soft law educational
requirement strikes the right balance. A soft law approach would also enhance
surrogate autonomy in place where surrogacy is already legal.

I.

Concerns about Paid Surrogacy
We will begin by examining concerns about paid surrogacy that focus in

some way on the surrogate’s vulnerability. Some of the arguments can be
answered sufficiently, as we will show, but others will persist. The legal solution
we propose offers some new answers to the remaining concerns.
We will need some terms for the people involved in the contract. First, the
‘contracting couple’ is the couple who, in an attempt to have a child, wishes to
employ a surrogate.4 In most cases, they will become the legal parents of the
child after its birth. The woman who enters an agreement with the contracting
couple to carry a child in her womb is the ‘gestational surrogate’, ‘surrogate
3

The term was originally used in the context of international law for codes which have little or no

binding force. Here we use it as a term for binding, enforceable laws that mandate some
performance or activity in order for one to obtain a certain legal permission. We describe soft law
more below.
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arrangements involve couples, we will use the term for the more common type of case.
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mother’, or ‘surrogate’ – terms we will use interchangeably. There is some
concern that the term ‘surrogate’ is prejudiced against her, since it already invites
the view that she occupies a less important role in the creation of the child than
the contracting couple. We share this concern about the term, but it has become
relatively standard, and alternative terms also have problems.
The child may have a genetic tie to the gestational surrogate; her egg
could be fertilized with the sperm of the contracting father. It could also happen
that the surrogate shares no genes with the child she carries; a fertilized egg could
be implanted into her womb. Some discussions distinguish the two situations
with different terms for the surrogate (for example, ‘traditional surrogate’ and
‘gestational surrogate’ respectively).5 In the arguments we will present, it does
not make a difference which of the two situations the surrogate is in, so we will
not use terms that reflect the distinction.

(1) Surrogacy contracts require a woman to perform nine months of
gestational labor and then sever all ties to the child almost immediately after its
birth. Some see surrogacy as a more subtle form of prostitution; the woman in
effect sells her womb and relinquishes control of her body. Prostitution is
generally not legal in the United States, and since surrogacy seems to be along the
same lines, the worry goes, it should not be legal either. The argument is that a

5

J.K. Ciccarelli, & J.C. Ciccarelli. The Legal Aspects of Parental Rights in Assisted Reproductive

Technology. J Soc Issues 2005; 61(1): 129. Note that Ciccarelli and Ciccarelli use the term
‘gestational surrogate’ more narrowly than we do.
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woman should not be able to enter into a contract in which she sells her body
under these circumstances.6 Call this the ‘prostitution argument’.
The prostitution argument is sensitive in some ways to the gestational
surrogate’s vulnerability, but it’s somewhat off target. For instance, prostitution
and surrogacy have importantly different objectives. Prostitution consists in the
selling of women’s bodies for sexual satisfaction; but the aim of surrogacy is to
bring a child into the world. Even though both are services performed for money,
the analogy is not solid – it is hard to compare prostitution and surrogacy when
their purposes are so different. Another objection to the prostitution argument is
that people are allowed to ‘sell their bodies’ in a broad variety of other ways. In
the U.S., people can sell eggs and sperm, plasma, hair, and they can accept jobs
that are known to compromise their physical health. Coal workers who know that
mining poses serious health risks – they know they are potentially shortening their
lives by accepting the job – are still allowed to make that decision. There is no
reason to think that surrogacy is more like prostitution, an illegal form of ‘bodyselling’, than it is like egg-selling, or any of the other legal forms of ‘bodyselling’.
Another objection to the argument about ‘body-selling’ is that surrogacy
contracts do not actually turn women’s bodies into objects of sale. There is a
difference between ‘compensating a woman for her services, and paying a woman

6
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Ethics. H.B. Holmes & L.M. Purdy, eds. Bloomington & Indianapolis. Indiana University Press:
290.
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for the use of her body’.7 To illustrate this difference, consider lawn mowing. If I
need my lawn mowed, there are two possibilities: I can pay you to use your
lawnmower, in which case I would take possession of your lawnmower for an
agreed period of time; or I can pay you for you to use your lawnmower to cut my
grass – in other words I would pay you for your service of mowing my lawn.
‘Any right I have here is at most a right to insist that you do with your
lawnmower what you said you would. But that is not a right to your
lawnmower.’8 Surrogacy is more like the case of being paid for the service. The
contracting couple does not gain a right to do whatever they please with the
woman’s body while she carries the child. The most they can do is ask that she
do with her body what she agreed to do in the contract. In surrogacy, then, a
woman is not ‘selling her body’ but being compensated for her services. Heidi
Malm says there is no more commodification in paying a surrogate than ‘paying a
surgeon to perform an operation, a cabby to drive a car, or a model to pose for a
statue’.9 That’s putting it too strongly – the surrogate’s service is more intimate
and bodily invasive than that of the surgeon, the cabby and the model – but the
prostitution analogy is still misleading.10
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(2) A related concern is that paid surrogacy is ‘baby-selling’. Like the
prostitution argument, which argues against the sale of women’s bodies, the babyselling argument contends that surrogacy contracts turn children into objects of
sale, which devalues their lives, and maybe broader human life as well.
Commodification of this sort, the argument says, is an attack on human dignity:
the child’s, but also the surrogate’s, the contracting couple’s, and everyone else’s,
too.
Like the gestational surrogate, children are vulnerable in surrogacy
arrangements, and we agree that their interests should be carefully protected,
although that is not our primary focus here. We also agree that there are
legitimate concerns about exposing gestation to marketplace norms. But there are
reasons to think that the baby-selling argument misfires. First, just as in our
objections to the last argument, the purpose of surrogacy is crucial. The
contracting couple want to be parents – they are not paying money to exploit the
child or to make a profit from a resale. Second, in most cases the contracting
father has supplied the sperm to create the child. He is genetically the father, so it
seems odd to say he is buying his own child. Third, contracts that ensure that the
surrogate can change her mind and keep the baby – the opt-out clause that we
mentioned above – help preserve the sense that she is selling a service, not a
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child. Contracts without an opt-out clause are more easily interpreted as selling a
product or outcome instead of a process.11
Most remaining objections about baby selling should be directed at
surrogacy brokers, rather than the gestational surrogate or the contracting couple,
both of whom stand in some danger of being exploited by these brokers. And in
any case, worries about third parties profiting from the contract are already
present in many adoption arrangements.12

(3) Even if these first two arguments are answered, it’s true that
compensation is an important incentive for many gestational surrogates. Kelly
Oliver only mildly overstates the situation when she says that ‘very few women, if
any, would perform surrogacy services without payment’.13 That surrogacy
arrangements would significantly diminish if paid surrogacy were illegal is itself a
11

Although our concern in this paper is with the surrogate herself, issues about child welfare are

deservedly the focus of much work on surrogacy. We don’t presume to answer all the concerns
about the exploitation, commodification, and well-being of the child. For a collection of concerns
about child welfare, see M. Brazier, M, A. Campbell, & S. Golombok. 1998. Surrogacy: Review
for Health Ministers of Current Arrangements for Payments and Regulation. Report of the Review
Team. London: Department of Health: 29-38. We do note that, as the Brazier Report speculates,
enhancing surrogacy autonomy may lower some of the risk of psychological harm to the child.
12

One new worry that surrogacy does present is this: adoption concerns relinquishing an existing

child, while surrogacy involves payment for the creation of a future child. Our thanks to an
anonymous referee for emphasizing this point.
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sign that there is something wrong with the practice. Or so says the
‘compensation argument’.
If the worry is that economic factors wrongfully force women into
entering these contracts, it is not clear that women are forced in this way. Many
people would not do their jobs if they were not paid, not just surrogate mothers.
Even people who love their work may do something else if they weren’t getting
paid, simply because they need to earn a living somehow. So the fact that most
surrogates want to be compensated for their services is not enough to show paid
surrogacy should be illegal.

(4) Compensation aside, some think paid surrogacy should be illegal
because the nature of the work is particularly unrelenting: the surrogate mother is
‘never off-duty’.14 She is under contract for perpetual service, twenty-four hours
a day, and ‘most people do not perform their service twenty-four hours a day,
unless they are slaves’.15
But most gestational surrogates have already had at least one child and are
not unaware of the pains and restrictions of gestating. And there are other jobs
women perform where they are ‘never off-duty’. Actors and models are restricted
in many areas of their lives – what they eat, how they dress, where they go and
with whom. Public scrutiny keeps them always on-duty. It is true that the
consequences are not quite the same. The actress who splurges on french fries

14
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and a milkshake hurts only herself. If a surrogate mother goes ‘off-duty’,
drinking alcohol or skipping a doctor’s appointment, she risks harm not just to
herself but the fetus as well. But the ‘never off-duty’ argument seems focused on
the vulnerability of the surrogate, not the fetus, so the situations are similar
enough.
Also analogous is the case of doctors. Doctors who are on call have
certain responsibilities, and even when not on-call, they are never entirely offduty. What they do in private areas of their lives can affect their work and in turn
the health and safety of others. The off-call doctor who gets intoxicated, even
though he knows his troubled patient may need him later, could be compromising
his responsibility to his patient. Even in an ideal world, where division of
physician labor were more fair, doctors would need to stay on-call for weeks to
monitor the course of certain patients’ progress.
Over the longer term, doctors are expected to remain informed about new
medical developments. Patients should be able to trust that doctors who
graduated from medical school decades earlier aren’t unaware of advances in
treatments and medications. Much of this information doctors will need to
assimilate when they are off-duty. So even with its characteristic demands, paid
surrogacy isn’t the only job with limitations on off-duty life.
It’s also worth noting that surrogates, actors, and doctors still retain broad
freedom about what they do, even when they are not fully off-duty. Surrogates,
for instance, can hold other jobs and care for their existing children.
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(5) The previous arguments don’t exhaust concerns about exposing
gestation to the marketplace. She is neither a prostitute nor a baby-seller, and she
is not a slave; but some argue that the gestational surrogate is mistreated by the
very nature of paid surrogacy arrangements. On the ‘mistreatment argument’,
paid surrogacy turns women’s bodies into commodities and means of production.
‘In general, within the surrogacy arrangement, the “surrogate” is treated as a
machine whose services can be exchanged for money.’16 Gender bias and
economic inequality make this sort of abuse inherent in the practice. The
contracting couple simply uses her womb and controls her life. Gestational labor
is alienated labor, and the law should protect candidate surrogates from that.17
This argument overstates the power contracting couples have over
surrogates. When the gestational surrogate signs the contract, she makes an
agreement to perform certain specific duties, but some state laws and court
decisions have wisely limited the breadth of control contracting couples can
exercise, as does legal precedent in general contract law. The couple cannot use
the surrogate’s body in any way they please; they can only expect that she carry
out the specific expectations set forth in the contract. And again, although the
surrogate mother is never ‘off-duty’, she can anticipate the restrictions that
healthy gestation will impose on her behavior; if she does not wish to submit
16

Ibid: 275.
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Kelly Oliver claims that surrogacy belongs in an especially invidious category of alienated

labor: “estranged labor.” But Oliver seems unclear about what qualifies certain labor as estranged.
Ibid: 274-276. See also G. Corea. 1985. The Mother Machine. New York: HarperCollins; C.
Overall. 1987. Ethics and Human Reproduction. Boston: Allen & Unwin.
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herself to these restrictions, she does not have to sign the contract. Even more
traditional jobs restrict people’s behavior in one way or another.
It is true that the surrogate is generally not on an equal footing with the
contracting couple. She is usually less economically well off and less educated
then the couple,18 and so she enters surrogacy arrangements more vulnerable to
mistreatment than the contracting couple. But the stronger form of the
mistreatment argument overstates both the level and risk of damage to the
surrogate.

(6) Some argue that surrogacy makes unfair predictive demands on
women. During gestation, it is common for a woman to develop strong feelings
towards the fetus growing in her womb. Contracts that demand that she harbor
these feelings and then give up the child she has grown attached to are
unreasonable. Surrogacy asks a woman to decide how she will feel towards a
child she carries but doesn’t intend to keep; but the extent and kind of connection
she will feel is too difficult to predict. It’s wrong, the ‘demanding prediction
argument’ says, to require that she commit to a process whose effect on her is in
principle impossible to foresee.
To address this particular sort of surrogate vulnerability, many laws and
brokers require her to have given birth to another child before being allowed to
enter into a surrogacy contract. But this provision may not be enough to answer
the worry – when she was pregnant before she did not carry the fetus with the
expectation of having to give it up after birth.
18

See the data presented in argument seven below.
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Another way to address this vulnerability is to allow the gestational
surrogate to change her mind and keep the child. On this view, surrogacy
arrangements should be more like most adoption arrangements. But even if she
can opt out, she has introduced expectations in the couple, and it may be painful
for her to violate these expectations. And some states (California, for instance, as
suggested by the Calvert decision19) do not necessarily allow surrogates to opt out
of the contract in this way. Those states need some other way to address this
particular vulnerability.20

(7) Some think surrogacy contracts are unfair to women for a different
reason: because women enter into these contracts under coercion. The thought is
that the surrogate’s choice process is burdened by circumstances that make it very
difficult to resist agreeing to something she does not really want to do. Call this –
a more subtle relative of the compensation argument above – the ‘coercion
argument’.
On the simplest view of coercion, this argument doesn’t make sense.
Paradigmatic cases of coercion involve limiting or removing an option, but
surrogacy contracts actually present women with an additional option. So how
can it be that they are coerced into these contracts, when they have in fact gained
another choice? One answer is that the simple view of coercion isn’t correct: a
19

Supreme Court of California. 1993. Johnson v. Calvert. 851 P.2d 776.

20

The demanding prediction argument is defended in S. Dodds & K. Jones. Surrogacy and

Autonomy. Bioethics 1990; 3(1): 1-17, and challenged in J. Oakley. Altruistic Surrogacy and
Informed Consent. Bioethics 1992; 6(4): 269-287.
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new option can instead leave someone less free than she was before. These are
what some call ‘coercive offers’.
To see this, consider the simpler, paradigmatic cases of coercion first. In
these cases, the coercer pushes a target person to act in the way the coercer wants
instead of the way the target wants, usually through threatening something
horrible. Some option formerly open to the target is either removed, or, more
often, its appeal is severely limited. Say an armed man approaches someone
walking home from work and demands, ‘Give me your wallet or I’ll shoot’.
Before the gunman appeared, the walker had a variety of open options. The
gunman has made exactly one of these options strongly compelling: giving up the
wallet. Technically, there are still multiple choices the walker can make:
relinquishing his wallet, attempting to seize the gun, running away. But the risk
of being shot and perhaps killed in any but the first option is high. The gunman
has coerced the walker by making the alternative to giving up his wallet very
costly. So even in straightforward cases of coercion, the target can be left with
other choices, but they are severely unappealing.
There is another type of circumstance in which options can be made very
costly – not by a demand enforced by a threat as in the walker and the gunman
situation, but through an offer. These ‘coercive offers’ are made to a target in
some vulnerable situation such that she may believe that she cannot act in another
way. Like the gunman’s threat, these are offers that cannot be refused without
great cost. On a simple view of coercion, offers would always increase freedom:
the target is presented with a new option that she did not have before, and she

15
does not lose any options that she had before; but certain cases make this simple
view untenable.
Consider, for instance, the case of the lecherous millionaire. ‘B’s child
will die unless she receives expensive surgery…. A, a millionaire, proposes to
pay for the surgery if B will agree to become his mistress.’21 In this example, B is
presented with a new option; she can become A’s mistress and acquire the means
to pay for the surgery that will save her child’s life. However, from B’s point of
view, there is seemingly no choice: either she sleeps with the millionaire, or her
child dies. So A has made B’s option of choosing not to be his mistress extremely
costly. She can refuse the offer – that choice is technically open to her – but the
cost severely limits its appeal. B’s inability to pay for life-saving surgery for her
child puts her in a position such that A’s offer seemingly can’t be refused. A put
B into a situation comparable to that of the walker confronted by the gunman.
The walker was coerced into giving the gunman his wallet because the gunman
made the cost of noncompliance too high. The walker could choose not to
comply with the gunman, but this option is so unappealing that it can be said he
was coerced into giving up his wallet. B’s situation is analogous: the cost of her
‘non-compliance’ with A’s offer is so high that we are justified in thinking she
was coerced.
Of particular importance is that B is in a position where she is very
vulnerable to A’s offer. We wouldn’t be concerned about B’s options if she did
not have a child who would die without an expensive operation, or if B had other

21
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reasonable means to raise the money. Therefore, an important factor in the idea
of coercive offers is the vulnerability of the party being coerced.
In a similar way, some argue that paid surrogacy is a new but coercive
option for many women. There are women who may feel that there is no other
way for them to make money. Perhaps being a surrogate mother is not an
attractive idea to them, but they feel that their other options are even more
unappealing. More than just unappealing, these other options are so costly that
the women cannot seriously consider them. By entering into a surrogacy contract,
a mother who already has children can make a comparatively good amount of
money and be able to stay at home with her other children while she works. In
this way, legal surrogacy contracts, although expanding numerically their options,
seem to coerce women into making a choice they do not prefer, yet cannot refuse
because the price of refusal is too high.
One response to the coercion argument is that some women enjoy being
pregnant; whatever their economic situation, surrogacy may not be a coercive
offer for them.22 A second response is this: most surrogates may not be
economically vulnerable enough for paid surrogacy to count as a coercive option.
The best available data indicates that most gestational surrogates are married and
have household incomes between $25,000 and $50,000 per year.23 This data does
22

J.A. Robertson. Surrogate Mothers: Not So Novel After All. Hastings Cent Rep 1983; 13(5): 29.

23
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D.C. Government Printing Office: 273-274. This is the largest study of gestational surrogates in
the U.S. The study provides income amounts in 1988 dollars; we have adjusted these to 2005
dollars. There is very little more recent data on surrogate demographics, especially with the large
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not show that the poorest women are entering into paid surrogacy contracts in
substantive numbers. Most surrogates are not so desperate for money that we
should think of them as coerced. Still, even few cases of possible coercion are
morally worrisome.24

All of these arguments concern, directly or indirectly, the vulnerability of
the surrogate. We have shown that some fail in straightforward ways – in
particular, the (1) prostitution, (2) baby-selling, (3) compensation, and (4) never
off-duty arguments. But the (5) mistreatment, (6) demanding prediction, and (7)
coercion arguments all still carry important weight. The risk to the surrogate of
exploitation and abuse is not as severe as these arguments claim, but they do show
that there is still plenty to worry about.
One response to the real vulnerability that these last arguments expose is
to make surrogacy contracts illegal. And indeed some states have done so, most
often because of concerns about children, but also to protect candidate surrogates,
our focus here. But banning paid surrogacy buys protection at a very high cost: it
deprives women of a deeply personal decision. Most generally think people
should be free to make choices that concern their own lives, and that the choices
relevant to the most intimate parts of their lives – what they think and believe,
sample size of the 1988 data. A problem with all such data is that does not include the many
surrogacy arrangements that are informal and unrecorded.
24

For more on coercive offers and undue inducements, see Dodds & Jones, op. cit. note 20; Purdy,

op. cit. note 10; and E. J. Emanuel. Undue Inducement: Nonsense on Stilts? Am J Bioeth 2005;
5(5): 9-13 (note also the follow-up articles in the same issue).
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with whom they form relationships, and what they do with their bodies – should
be protected the most strenuously. To make it legally impossible for the surrogate
to perform gestational labor, even commercial gestational labor, is to limit her
autonomy too much. Even if the surrogate is vulnerable to some exploitation,
respect for her autonomy means not wholly removing paid surrogacy as one of
her options. Otherwise, she is wronged: nothing less than bodily autonomy is at
stake here.
Making paid surrogacy legal isn’t just an unfortunate capitulation that
autonomy demands. Contracts, including the right sort of surrogacy contracts,
can enhance and extend freedom in significant ways. Marjorie Maguire Shultz
writes that:
Where arrangements involve several persons, where the opportunity for
planning and deliberation exists, where reliance is weighty, where
expectations are substantial and their validation is personally and socially
important – as is true of reproductive agreements – contracts offer a means
of arranging and protecting these various interests.25
Shultz adds that contracts are a crucial resource for ‘projecting intention and
choice into the future’. Contracts make possible choices that wouldn’t be possible
otherwise – they extend freedom and power. Surrogacy contracts have this
capability as well.26 The contracting couple gains the ability to have a child who
25

Cited in N.R. Elster. Assisted Reproductive Technologies: Contracts, Consents, and

Controversies. Am J Fam Law. 2005; 18(4).
26

Contracts are not an ideal model for many of the most crucial and intimate of human

relationships, as feminist ethicists such as Virginia Held have argued (V. Held. 1987. Feminism
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is (at least in part) genetically theirs, or at the very least the ability to initiate a
pregnancy. The gestational surrogate also gains freedom and power: a new
opportunity for paid labor, and the experience of playing a crucial role in bringing
new life into the world, without all the antecedent costs of child-raising.
So the dilemma is clear: the surrogate is vulnerable in important ways, but
autonomy prevents a ban, and even positively supports the enhanced choice that
surrogacy contracts make possible. If surrogacy contracts are made illegal,
women are wronged. However, we saw earlier some unanswered concerns that
surrogacy contracts themselves wrong women – by allowing them, the law seems
to be failing to protect women in important ways. We want to argue that there is
an important and untapped legal tool that, short of a ban, addresses the most
important vulnerability arguments. We turn to that proposal now.

II.

A ‘Soft Law’ Solution
At present, the fifty U.S. states have varying laws (or no direct laws at all)

regarding surrogacy. Six states allow individuals and couples to enter into
surrogacy contracts, and ten prohibit them in all or some instances. The other
thirty-four states have mixed or unclear laws and case rulings on whether or not
surrogacy contracts are allowed. Utah, in a recent and unexpected development,
legalized some paid surrogacy arrangements in 2005.27 But almost without

and Moral Theory. In Women and Moral Theory. E.F. Kittay & D.T. Meyers, eds. Totowa, NJ:
Rowman & Littlefield: 111-128). But we believe that in certain limited domains, including
surrogacy, contracts can be autonomy protecting and freedom enhancing.
27

Utah bill S.B. 14, signed into law 16 March 2005.
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exception these laws are too crude. What they miss is a particular form of ‘soft
law’.
‘Soft law’ is that part of law concerned not with crimes and torts, but
instead permissions. Soft law mandates performances or activities that must
occur before some sort of status change – performances and activities designed to
protect some substantive state interest, such as public safety. Driver’s license
tests, marriage license procedures, and medical license procedures are all soft law.
Sometimes soft law protects others (medical licenses); sometimes it protects the
person seeking the status change as well: the driver’s license process certainly
protects the driver, and in principle the marriage license process can protect not
just possible offspring from disease, but also the couple from unknown health
conditions and factual misrepresentation. Protection of the vulnerable from harm
is the most common justification of soft law.
Consider another, less familiar example of soft law. In the state of
Connecticut, any couple with a child/children under the age of eighteen that seeks
a divorce is required by the state to attend ‘Parenting Education Classes’.28 These

28

Information in this section on Connecticut’s ‘Parenting Education Program’ is from the
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http://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/pub/Chap815j.htm#Sec46b-69b.htm [Accessed 9 Jul 2007]. For
further state-issued information on the program, see: State of Connecticut Judicial Branch. 2005.
Parenting Education Programs. Hartford, CT: State of Connecticut. Available at:
http://www.jud2.state.ct.us/webforms/forms/fm151.pdf [Accessed 9 Jul 2007].
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classes, a total of six hours in length, are intended to educate parents about the
effects of divorce on children. They also teach dispute resolution and offer advice
on how to deal with the upcoming new family circumstances. All of this is
intended to reduce a negative effect of divorce: that which it has on children who
must adapt to a new living situation. Connecticut is not the only state to carry
these requirements for divorcing parents. Missouri’s ‘Focus on Kids’ program
has similar rules and aims.29
A soft law approach to paid surrogacy can address the vulnerability
arguments above while guarding a woman’s reproductive freedom. We propose
that states offer ‘Surrogate Education Classes’, completion of which is required of
those who intend to enter legal paid surrogacy contracts. The class would feature
information about the surrogacy process: what contracts can and cannot
legitimately demand of women, what past surrogates have said about their
experiences, what other employment opportunities are open to women, and so

The Connecticut program is successful: ‘Over 90% rate the course very beneficial in the
initial evaluation and two-thirds continue to see benefits from the course six to twelve months
later’ (Connecticut Council of Family Service Agencies. Parenting Education Program (PEP).
Hartford, CT: State of Connecticut. Available at: http://www.ctfsa.org/programs/pep.html
[Accessed 9 Jul 2007]).
29

For further information on Missouri’s ‘Focus on Kids’ program, see: University of Missouri-

Columbia (UM-C). 2006. Focus on Kids. Columbia, MO: UM-C. Available at:
http://missourifamilies.org/fok/ [Accessed 9 Jul 2007]. For more on divorce soft law, see: E.
Biondi. Legal Implementation of Parent Education Programs for Divorcing and Separating
Parents. Fam Concil Courts Rev 1996 34(11): 82-95.
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forth.30 The aim in all of this is to decrease the surrogate’s vulnerability – to help
her be an informed, deliberate choice maker.
Some specific ways surrogacy classes answer the remaining vulnerability
worries are these. First, information about what is and is not legitimate in
contracts is important because of the ‘mistreatment argument’ (argument five
above). We saw that even though the contracting couple’s control over the
surrogate is restricted by some specific surrogacy laws and by legal precedent, the
couple and surrogate are still on an unequal footing. Contracting couples are
generally better educated than gestational surrogates, and they are more likely to
be informed about their rights and limitations in a contractual arrangement. The
surrogacy class can address some of this inequality. Surrogates should learn that,
for instance, while responsible gestation requires her to eat healthily, she retains
control over crucial choices that affect her own body. Surrogates should also
learn about whatever other specific rights – such as the option to keep the child
after birth – the specific state does or does not allow.31 For instance, class

30

There are similar solutions outside the U.S. context, our focus in this paper. Some states in

Australia already use a soft law approach for other assisted reproductive technologies; in Victoria,
for example, people who seek IVF treatment are required to obtain pre-treatment counseling about
the treatment’s risks and benefits. In the U.K., the required counseling already provided by the
HFEA could be expanded to include surrogate education. (We thank two anonymous referees for
these suggestions.)
31

Legal limitations on what contracts can demand of surrogates, and the idea of an opt-out clause

that lets the surrogate change her mind about keeping the child, can also help address the
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members in California would learn that, at least in circumstances like those in the
Calvert case, a surrogate who changes her mind may not keep the child. Educated
surrogates are less likely to be commodified and mistreated.
Second, class participants should hear the experiences of others who have
worked as paid gestational surrogates. Ideally, class members should meet former
surrogates themselves directly; at a minimum, they should hear both statistical
information – health, demographic, and other data – and personal stories written
or recorded by past surrogates. This element of the class helps address the
‘demanding prediction argument’ (argument six above). Former surrogates are in
an ideal position to convey what it is like to gestate, with the intent not to raise, a
being to whom they are either partly or not at all genetically related; they are the
authorities on the sort of attachment that gestational surrogates come to feel.
Candidate surrogates may have gestated their own children before, but this does
not mean they will be able to accurately predict how they will feel in a surrogacy
arrangement. By hearing the experiences of others, their prediction will be better
grounded and more cautious.
A third basic element of the class is information about other forms of
employment. The ‘coercion argument’ (argument seven above) suggested that
even though paid surrogacy presents some women with a new opportunity, their
socioeconomic circumstances may make it an encumbered, problematic
opportunity. While statistically surrogates do not tend to be among the absolutely
vulnerability arguments. But even so, we argue that required surrogacy classes are indispensable:
these other approaches are useless if the surrogate doesn’t know about them.
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worst off, they are still women whose circumstances are not entirely comfortable.
Some may think that paid surrogacy is the only way they can earn additional
money. Some women, especially single women, may see surrogacy as a way to
work while still taking care of their own existing children. They may not be
aware of what the surrogacy class can tell them: there are other jobs that can be
done at home or jobs with subsidized day care and/or flexible hours. Some of this
information should be dispensed in written form (pamphlets, job resource contacts
and phone numbers, etc.), and individual personal counseling, outside the class,
may be important, too. The more informed women are about genuine alternatives
like these, the less vulnerable they are to coercion.
Developing a network with other surrogates can be another important
result of the course. Introducing the potential surrogate to others considering the
same choice, as well as women who have already been surrogate mothers, will let
her talk first hand with other women who may have, or once have had, the same
concerns as she does. If a surrogate mother has support, and is able to talk to
other people who have gone through or are going through the same experiences, it
will make the process easier on her.
Many of the details about the course can be left to the discretion of
individual states, but we argue for the following additional structural elements.
First, this should be a multi-session instead of a single-session course. Retention
will be higher if there are multiple sessions, and the (modest) time period between
sessions will give the candidate surrogate a chance to reflect on her choice and
bring her own questions back to the group.
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Next, the total class time need not be long – six to eight hours of
instruction and dialogue should be sufficient. But at least two of these hours
should consist of a one-on-one meeting between the candidate surrogate and a
counselor. The counselor can help the woman be reflective about the reasons for
which she is entering the contract. And time alone with each potential surrogate
will allow the counselor to address specific concerns. Without being in front of a
large group of people or worrying about time constraints, the candidate surrogate
is more likely to voice her own independent questions and concerns.
A third issue concerns the cost of the classes. There are four obvious
candidate payers here: (1) the state, (2) one of the contracting parties’ health
insurance plans, (3) the potential surrogate, or (4) the contracting couple.
Because the course will not be cheap to run (it involves a paid instructor as well
as someone qualified to provide one-on-one counseling), and because surrogacy is
not a medically necessity (and so health insurance does not usually cover any fees
related to the contract and procedure), it is difficult to justify obtaining the funds
from either of the first two sources. Also, because the surrogate is most often
economically not well-off, it is unfair to ask her to pay for the class. So the best
option seems to be to include it in the costs a contracting couple will have to pay
for the entire surrogacy process. It is normal that a contracting couple foot the bill
for the medical expenses, maternity clothes, and other pregnancy-related costs
incurred by the surrogate. It seems, then, most natural that the contracting couple
subsidize the course as well.

26
Fourth, a required separate class session for the contracting couple may be
important as well. They too can benefit from hearing from former participants in
surrogacy contracts, both so that their own expectations are realistic, and because
the more sympathy and understanding they have for the experiences of gestating
surrogates, the less vulnerable the surrogate herself.
Finally, a candidate surrogate need only complete the program once, not
every time she wants to enter a contact. Childcare should be provided for class
members – after all, some women choose surrogacy exactly because it allows
them to work without being away from their children.
It’s important to emphasize that the surrogacy course is not intended to
steer women away from surrogacy. Potential surrogates should be assured that
the training and counseling is to help them, not hinder them. In order to present
the sort of information described above as neutrally and objectively as possible,
care must go into choosing educators and counselors. These class leaders should
be familiar with surrogacy law and the surrogacy experience, or at the very least
be able to marshal presenters who are. It is important that they announce
themselves as advocates for the women in the program. They are not trying to
scare or to prohibit candidate surrogates from making their own decisions. The
counselors and educators, rather, are working as proponents of the surrogate; they
are trying to create a favorable and fair environment for the contracts to take
place. Upon completing the class, some may indeed decide not to become
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surrogates.32 Those who do will be able to make a more reflective personal
decision.
This last point – that surrogacy courses are intended and structured to
enhance, not restrict, the autonomy of the surrogate – is crucial. It distinguishes
our approach from other soft law approaches that, either explicitly or as revealed
by the shape of the policy, simply attempt to discourage some behavior. For
instance, a state law that requires women seeking an abortion to first view pictures
of the remains of aborted fetuses is unlikely to be aimed at enhancing their
autonomy. Soft law policies of the sort we defend here do exact costs (in time,
energy, and other resources), and any benefits that don’t accrue to those who pay
these costs, or any moral constraints that asymmetrically handicap them, demand
special justification. Our proposal meets this test in a way that other soft law
approaches often do not: enhancing the candidate surrogate’s autonomy is both
the explicit and structural aim of the surrogacy classes.
And this proposal offers a way out of the dilemma that confronted us
earlier – ban paid surrogacy, or respect a surrogate’s autonomy to expose herself
to possible exploitation and abuse. A ban wrongs women, because choices about
what one does with one’s body are deeply personal and crucial; and legalizing
crude paid surrogacy wrongs women, because of the asymmetric vulnerability of

32

If they do decide against paid surrogacy, the Baby M case suggests that both the candidate

surrogate and the contracting couple will be better off – and fewer children will face the sort of
parental limbo that Baby M herself faced.
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candidate surrogates. We’ve described a neglected third way – a legal tool that
honors and expands autonomy.

